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Introduction: Whiteness between Privilege and Anxiety 
If one is to believe former Breitbart senior editor Milo Yiannopoulos, young white men 
are at risk of missing out on proper higher education. Luckily for said young white men, 
Yiannopoulos has lent his name to the newly launched Yiannopoulos Privilege Grant, 
which “is exclusively available to white men who wish to pursue their post-secondary ed-
ucation on equal footing with their female, queer and ethnic minority classmates.” (“The 
Privilege Grant”)2 Even if one has only vaguely followed Yiannopoulos’ career as a poster 
boy for the alt-right until his recent misfortune3, one can surely imagine the glee with 
which Yiannopoulos has decided for the name of his grant scheme. After all, what would 
infuriate “woke” liberal social justice warriors (as he would denounce his enemies) more 
than a tongue-in-cheek flip on the concept of white privilege – a set of characteristics 
which whiteness scholar Paula S. Rothenberg, has called “the other side of racism” 
(2016)?  
 Risking accusations of sarcasm, one might say that both Rothenberg and Yiannopou-
los seem to be concerned about equal opportunities in education, if from different angles. 
What is safe to say, however, is that what is at stake in the founding of the grant is the 
conspicuous relationship between race, ethnicity, social position and privilege. In the US, 
this relationship has not become easier with the election of Donald Trump, and even if the 
dynamics of race, ethnicity and class are not necessarily always and in every instance 
comparable, the same can be said about Britain in the age of UKIP and Brexit.4  
                                                        
1 I would like to thank Tonnia L. Anderson and Evangelia Kindinger for important suggestions and discus-
sions during the writing of this article. 
2 In proper academic fashion, these statements are backed up with a number of footnotes leading to peer-
reviewed journal articles, newspaper think pieces etc., a discussion of which would exceed the limits of this 
article.  
3 After a video surfaced in early 2017 in which Yiannopoulos condones sexual relationships with underage 
boys, several organisations rescinded their invitations, and Simon & Schuster cancelled the publication of 
his autobiography (cf. Peters et al. 2017). 
4 The resurgence of the right and racism is of course not limited to these two countries, as the Front National 
in France and the AfD in Germany clearly demonstrate. I will, however, concentrate on the US and Britain 
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 Analysing and understanding the rise of the new right entails understanding what 
role race, ethnicity, and, more precisely, the racial and social formation of whiteness play 
for it. In the following, I want to shed light on this issue by arguing that the analysis of the 
new right and its cultural expressions can benefit from an approach informed by Critical 
Whiteness Studies. I will therefore focus on the concepts of white hegemony and white 
privilege and propose some routes (which by no means are supposed to be proper solu-
tions) to take in this debate. Critical Whiteness Studies, as a relatively young academic 
discipline, has been preoccupied with analysing and interrogating concepts of racial he-
gemony, white supremacy and white privilege both in historical context and in the pre-
sent.5 The question regarding the current rise of the new right is whether and in how far 
western cultures are witnessing a strengthening of whiteness as a hegemonic social and 
racial formation.  
 However, this issue does not seem to be unique to the current conjuncture. A “new 
racism” was already diagnosed in the emerging climate of neoconservatism and neoliber-
alism in the 1980s and early 1990s. Back then, several publications focussing on the po-
litical developments visible in the UK and the US asked the question whether what was 
back then labelled as the new right under Thatcher and Reagan, respectively, was con-
nected to a new kind of racism. For example, Amy Elizabeth Ansell’s 1997 monograph on 
the subject is paradigmatically titled New Right, New Racism. Race and Reaction in the 
United States and Britain.6 I contend that by drawing on insight from Critical Whiteness 
Studies and by comparing the situation of the 1980s and now, whiteness can be dissected 
as one of the driving forces of the current new right even when, and often precisely be-
cause, it is often rendered invisible. 
 By looking at the discourses connected to the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit 
referendum, I argue that whiteness plays a crucial role in the current national imaginaries 
of the new right as well as in the attempts at explaining the rise and appeal of the new 
right. What lies at the heart of the new right’s relationship with whiteness is a simultane-
ous hyperbolisation and obfuscation of whiteness. In the following, I argue for an inter-
sectional analytical approach to understanding how whiteness is placed within hege-
monic processes. This will also allow for uncovering the inherent paradoxes in whiteness 
as a social and racial formation. I will conclude my argument with a discussion of the po-
tentials of Critical Whiteness Studies as a discipline in the current global political climate. 
 
                                                        
in my argument since these are the two cultural contexts within which the study of whiteness has most 
fruitfully been employed.  
5 Cf. Rothenberg 2016 for a collection of key texts on the concept of white privilege and Garner 2007 for an 
overview of the discipline’s main trajectories as well as for its potential political “pitfalls” (8-11). 
6 Other publications include Seidel 1987 and Gordon/Klug 1985. 
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Evading Race in the 1980s and Today 
Tackling the issue of race, whiteness and the current new right must involve the tracing 
of continuities between the 1980s emergence and link of the new right and a new racism 
on the one hand, and the current situation on the other. A common element between the 
1980s and now can be detected in the often paradoxical and multi-layered discourse on 
race. Indeed, it is the very obfuscation of race as a relevant identity category that can be 
identified as one of the common denominators: as analyses in the 1980s have shown, the 
rhetorical and political strategies of the new right demonstrate a tendency to relativize 
race while simultaneously evoking it in new guises. A paradigmatic example, analysed by 
Paul Gilroy in his seminal study There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack, is the 1983 election 
campaign poster of the Conservative Party (cf. 2002: 63-65). The poster shows a black 
man in suit and tie, accompanied by the headline “Labour says he’s black; Tories say he’s 
British.” (qtd. in Gilroy 2002: 64) As the accompanying text argues, the Labour Party al-
legedly fixes and reduces people of colour to their racial identity position rather than ac-
knowledging them as “equal” British citizens. The text goes on to argue that said equality 
is expressed in each individual’s willingness to work hard and be measured according to 
their achievements, irrespective of race.  
 This discursive strategy bears many similarities to the current discourse of colour-
blindness – a discourse which has been criticised by race scholars and activists as prob-
lematic since this seemingly well-meaning gesture is in fact indicative of a refusal to see 
how racial thinking as well as its symbolic and material expressions ultimately still have 
an effect on the lived realities of people of colour. Being colour-blind thus also means 
blindness to ways of challenging structural disadvantage based on race, for even if some 
might be colour-blind, others certainly aren’t. Colour-blindness, it has been argued, is thus 
a form of complicity with latent racism, i.e. a “racism without racists” (Hart 2016: 36).7 In 
the Tory poster, Britishness is offered as an inclusive identity which is primarily defined 
by individual merit. However, taking into account the criticism of colour-blindness, the 
poster ignores that black British people might not have the same structural and economic 
advantages to adhere to this meritocratic ideal.8 That is, even when, as the poster states, 
“[t]he Conservatives believe that everyone wants to work hard and be rewarded for it […] 
                                                        
7 Writing about the situation in the US after the killing of Trayvon Martin in 2012, William David Hart de-
scribes colour-blindness as “the dominant expression of racism in post-civil rights America. […] Colorblind 
racism obscures the legacy of social death, the ongoing crisis of civil death, and the virtual probation that 
shadows the lives of black Americans.” (2016: 36f) Amanda Lewis goes further in identifying colour-blind-
ness as complicit with, if not constitutive of current dominant racial and social formations: “Color-blindness 
is a variant on the tradition of liberal individualism that denies the reality of groups and group-based priv-
ileges/penalties, thereby obscuring relations of domination.” (2004: 636) 
8 In his analysis of the poster, Gilroy adds an intersectional perspective by interpreting the black man shown 
on the poster as the representation of a “solitary maleness” which he reads as an expression of “the logics 
of racist discourse” which “militate against the possibility of making British blackness visible in a family or 
an inter-generational group” (2002: 65). 
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regardless of their race, creed or colour”, this party mission statement does not account 
for the problem that certain sections might not even have the same access to job oppor-
tunities simply because they have been at a structural disadvantage from the outset. To 
put it differently: a proclamation of colour-blindness does not single-handedly change 
persistent racist attitudes that lead to structural disadvantage, in the worst case, it might 
even prevent solutions towards a non-racist society. However, this is a logic which is still 
present in discourses on race and ethnicity in Britain and the US today. 
 In their Searchlight special issue on New Right, New Racism, Paul Gordon and Fran-
cesca Klug analyse how this logic has been carried further throughout the 1980s. Gordon 
and Klug identify the emergence of new right pressure groups and commentators (some-
times associated with the right wing of the Conservative Party, sometimes not affiliated 
with the party) which carry these arguments further in the light of Thatcherism’s loss of 
popular appeal (cf. 1985: 7), and inspired by the thinking of Enoch Powell (cf. 1985: 16). 
At the heart of this new right discourse is the ‘way of life’ of the ‘ordinary people’. Para-
phrasing an argument made by Powell in 1983, Gordon and Klug identify the new racism 
as drawing on the idea of nation and culture: “Such a way of life includes not just language 
and customs but also beliefs and feelings, in short, a ‘culture’ and while there are many 
ways of grouping, the most important way in which people who share a way of life come 
together is in a ‘nation.’” (1985: 16) The “newness” of this new racism in the 1980s rests 
in its firm denial of biological differences between people. Instead, it emphasises culture, 
tradition, habits, the nation and identity – and it is this identity which sets populations 
apart. This new sense of national identity rests on a firm Powellian territorialism and a 
resulting scepticism towards immigration (cf. Gordon/Klug 1985: 19). These, as Powell 
and his ideological successors might argue, rest not on biological race but a sense of (Brit-
ish) culture and tradition. Yet, as Paul Gilroy has argued, despite the logic that Britishness 
is supposed to supersede race as the defining marker of identity, neoconservative dis-
course does not restrict the definition of national identity to the “legal definitions” of citi-
zenship – “[t]here is more to Britishness than a passport”, and it is still defined “in the 
sphere of culture.” (2002: 65).9  
 However, what is possibly most crucial about this new racism is its very denial of rac-
ism: “The proponents of the new racism emphatically deny that they are racist. One of the 
ways in which they do this is to offer a definition of racism and then declare that they do 
not subscribe to such ideas. Once again, this strategy dates back to Powell’s statements in 
                                                        
9 Gilroy goes on to argue that the “politics of ‘race’ in this country is fired by conceptions of national belong-
ing and homogeneity which not only blur the distinction between ‘race’ and nation, but rely on that very 
ambiguity for their effect.” (2002: 44) This argument ties in with a similar observation made by Vron Ware 
on notions of Anglo-British identity, or Englishness, as often being implicitly synonymous with whiteness. 
Due to this ambiguity, Ware argues, whiteness is of a “volatile nature” (2001: 192). There is thus a constant 
ambiguity of the racial connotations of national identity and vice versa. 
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the late 1960s” (Gordon/Klug 1985: 20). This strategy is reminiscent of the current rhet-
oric of the alt-right, parts of the Brexit campaign and similar political actors. As Steve Gar-
ner (2012; 2016: 34-49) has shown in his studies of whiteness in contemporary Britain, 
cultural racisms are very often being played out with the awareness that racism is offi-
cially taboo and a punishable offence. That is, anti-racism, or at least the condemnation of 
racism by the political ‘establishment’ is perceived by (cultural) racists as the dominant 
discourse that their own ‘subversive’ views are opposed to.  
 As Amy Ansell (1997) has argued in her study of new racisms of the 1980s and 1990s 
in the US and Britain, those new racisms are played out in terms of hegemonic strategies 
– the expression of racist views is adapted to the dominant discourse of the times, antici-
pates the potential discursive sanctioning of explicitly racist views and statements, and 
consequently develops alternative discursive strategies to package racist views in an “ac-
ceptable” form. This “Gramscianism of the Right” aims at a “conservative revolution in the 
arena of culture and ideas” that complements the “conservative policy revolution.” (Ansell 
1997: 25)10 Twenty years later, this definition ties in with the widely-made observation 
that parties like UKIP have from the outset been “anti-establishment” parties which chal-
lenged the dominant status quo by appealing to a disenfranchised and precarious collec-
tive which has been failed by the major parties (cf. Ford/Goodwin 2014: 270). In a similar 
vein, Trumpism in the US can be considered as an anti-establishment politics which ap-
peals to an electorate that no longer trusts the major parties and for whom the ‘outsider’ 
Donald Trump becomes a trustworthy carrier of ‘fresh’ ideas. Following Ernesto Laclau’s 
analysis of populism, the racially charged thinking and rhetoric of UKIP and Trump fol-
lows the strict “division of the social scene into two camps”, with figures like Nigel Farage 
and Donald Trump representing the “oppressed underdog” (2007: 87). The signifiers of 
cultural belonging that can be found in both the British and the American variants of the 
current new right discourse can thus be conceived of as “empty signifiers” which are em-
ployed in an effort to come to terms with the “experience of a lack” of the “fullness of the 
community” (Laclau 2007: 85). In order to achieve this “fullness”, the community needs 
to be constructed and articulated in an “equivalential chain” (Laclau 2007: 84) of empty 
signifiers. When, for example, Nigel Farage says that “we want our country back” (“UKIP” 
2015), then one might ask: what are “we” and “country” actually signifying? Who precisely 
is ‘we’ and whom exactly do they want to have their country back from?  
 In this context of anti-establishment politics, cultural racism – a racism which 
acknowledges that race is not a biological fact, but nevertheless uses racializing strategies 
                                                        
10 Ansell defines the New Right as representing “that section of the right wing distinct from both traditional 
conservatism and from more extreme Far Right groupings. Its distinctiveness is most commonly attributed 
to its emphasis on social issues – although its stress on free market economics has been crucial for its overall 
appeal. It is important to study the New Right since it, more than any other section of the contemporary 
right wing, has served as a catalyst in connecting popular backlash sentiments with the electoral strategies 
and policy goals of the Republican and Conservative Parties.” (1997: 30)  
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– is thus a form of racism that can find its way into dominant political discourse: “New 
Rightists are keenly aware of the charges of racism commonly attributed to previous 
right-wing movements and consistently and proactively respond by insisting that their 
views do not represent racism but realism.” (Ansell 1997: 62) The rhetorical strategy of 
evading race, yet insisting on “cultural” differences between populations becomes in this 
respect something which could be called ‘outsider truth’ – a truth which only the anti-
establishment ‘realists’ speak and which is allegedly willingly ignored by establishment 
politicians. Trump’s “Muslim Ban” can in that respect be considered an exemplary strat-
egy: it pits different and allegedly incompatible ways of life against each other under the 
pretence of cultural protectionism when what is at stake is in fact a racially connoted is-
lamophobia. In a similar vein, UKIP’s “Breaking Point” poster, issued only a few weeks 
before the 2016 “Brexit” referendum, with its imagery of refugees plays with fears of cul-
tural collapse. It employs suggestive racist tropes, all the while evading the explicit dis-
course of race. 
 
Playing with the Signifiers of Race 
The current new right is also acutely aware of such discursive pitfalls, as Milo Yiannopou-
los and his co-author Allum Bokhari show in their “Establishment Conservative’s Guide to 
the Alt-Right” on breitbart.com (one of the main agents in the current new right’s “revolu-
tion in the arena of culture and ideas”). They describe the type of the “natural conserva-
tive” as one of the most common representatives of the current alt-right. Their description 
of the “natural conservative” is in many ways indicative of this new cultural racism, with 
western European culture and tribalism substituting for race:  
For natural conservatives, culture, not economic efficiency, is the paramount value. 
More specifically, they value the greatest cultural expressions of their tribe. Their 
perfect society does not necessarily produce a soaring GDP, but it does produce sym-
phonies, basilicas and Old Masters. The natural conservative tendency within the 
alt-right points to these apotheoses of western European culture and declares them 
valuable and worth preserving and protecting. (Bokhari/Yiannopoulos 2016: 
n.pag.) 
Bokhari and Yiannopoulos argue that this focus on cultural value and heritage distin-
guishes natural conservatives from what they call establishment conservatives (Republi-
cans in the US, for example) who would be primarily driven by neoliberal free market 
economic interests. In addition, they claim that “the alt-right would argue that they’re [the 
“establishment conservatives”] too afraid of being called ‘racist’ to seriously fight against 
it. Which is why they haven’t” (Bokhari/Yiannopoulos 2016: n.pag.). According to the two 
authors, Donald Trump has presented himself as the “first truly cultural candidate for 
President since Buchanan” (Bokhari/Yiannopoulos 2016: n.pag.). Whether Trump can be 
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considered a “cultural conservative” (no matter whether this is being judged from the left 
or from the right) or would declare himself to be one is debatable, but what can be gath-
ered from this line of argument is that the right’s obsession with “culture” is conspicuous 
and must be assessed. 
 “Culture”, whenever it is being used to emphasise the speaker’s sense of value and 
belief-system, and especially when it is used to distinguish oneself from common racist 
positions, is never really free from racial and ethnic connotations. As Ali Rattansi has ar-
gued, emphasis on cultural difference, even if it meticulously avoids reference to any bio-
logical markers, still takes place in the semantic realm of race and ethnicity. This becomes 
clear when culturalist arguments are examined for their essentialist traits:  
In practice, […] cultural demarcations are often drawn and used in a form that nat-
uralizes them by implying that they are more or less immutable. Thus the supposed 
avariciousness of Jews, the alleged aggressiveness of Africans and African Ameri-
cans, the criminality of Afro-Caribbeans or the slyness of ‘Orientals’, become traits 
that are invariably attached to these groups over extremely long periods of time. The 
descriptions may then be drawn upon as part of a common-sense vocabulary of ste-
reotypes that blur any strict distinction between culture and biology. (Rattansi 
2007: 104f; emphasis in orig.)  
Such tendencies become visible in a number of recent examples in the UK and US, but also 
in other countries.  
 In the UK, historian David Starkey’s response to the English Riots in 2011 on BBC 
Newsnight was heavy with the discourse of cultural difference when he blamed “nihilistic 
black gangster culture” for the growing violence in communities like Tottenham (BBC 
2011: n.pag.). While he emphasised that he was not concerned with racial features – “it’s 
not about skin colour, it’s culture” – he nevertheless claimed that this gangster culture 
proved to be infectious across cultural differences by stating that “the whites have become 
black” (BBC 2011: n.pag.). In this use, “culture” can be argued to operate in terms of 
Laclau’s equivalential chains. 
 While Starkey is certainly neither the prototypical alt-right neo-racist nor a UKIP-
friendly figure, his argument still evidences a considerable tendency in British society and 
public discourse to consider differences among people along the lines of racist argu-
ments.11 Following Rattansi’s argument, the distinction “between culture and biology” is 
clearly being blurred in such statements. Such tendencies become especially visible in the 
discourse on migration which is so central to the Brexit question and the driving fuel for 
                                                        
11 Ann Phoenix has analysed Starkey’s statement as a “new racist” argument (cf. 2012: 63). Cf. also Tyler 
2013: 88f. 
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many UKIP politicians. Rattansi demonstrates that the immigrant is the key figure of cul-
tural racism which also evokes a new sense of whiteness. This becomes evident in  
arguments common in the 1980s (and now revived in a different form) that the real 
racists are not indigenous whites, but the black and Asian immigrants who insist on 
keeping alive a wide range of their own ways of life while still wanting to claim full 
rights as British citizens and turning whites into ‘second-class citizens.’ (Rattansi 
2007: 101)  
Structurally, even David Starkey’s comments appear to follow a similar pattern. In both 
arguments, whether they are concerned with the “invasive” cultures of immigrants or the 
corrupting influence of black gangster culture on white youths, white culture appears to 
be in a precarious position.  
 This, I would argue, is an affective structure which lies at the heart of the current rise 
of the new right and its racist tendencies. The new right appeals to many white people 
because it articulates the anxieties rooted in a perceived loss of cultural identity and 
power. Whiteness, as Steve Garner has shown in a series of qualitative interviews with 
white working-class and middle-class Britons, is now often considered to be “a position 
of injury and beleaguredness” (2012: 460). Garner shows how the social world of contem-
porary white Britons is based on a “racialized understanding” in which “to be an ethnic 
minority grants privilege that the white working class used to enjoy through a national 
framework of belonging” (2012: 460). Consequently, for those white Britons who per-
ceive their ethnic and cultural identity to be under threat, “the nation-state is thus a pres-
ence framing the current racialisation discourse” (Garner 2012: 460). In the same vein, 
the emphasis on cultural traits, national belonging etc. does not diminish or relativise the 
importance of biological racial or ethnic traits. In fact, as Garner argues, the desire to re-
duce the complexity of social narratives and relationships of power eventually leads to a 
return to old-fashioned markers of distinction: “despite claims that we are living in times 
of ‘cultural racism’, ‘new racism’, ‘colour-blind racism’, etc., in which culture is the key 
theme of discourse, people still simultaneously make sense of difference through the old-
school visual distinction of skin tone, hair type, facial features, etc.” (Garner 2012: 459) 
 Here, the current alt-right inhabits a special position. While, like the new right of the 
1980s and 1990s, they are acutely aware of the current taboos of explicit biological rac-
ism, they distinguish themselves from earlier new right protagonists in that they con-
sciously and wilfully play with the signifiers of race and thus engage in the power play of 
racialisation. Returning to Bokhari and Yiannopoulos’ “typology” of the alt-right, this be-
comes evident in the following observation regarding the alt-right’s concern with cultural 
purity:  
The alt-right’s intellectuals would also argue that culture is inseparable from race. 
The alt-right believe that some degree of separation between peoples is necessary 
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for a culture to be preserved. A Mosque next to an English street full of houses bear-
ing the flag of St. George, according to alt-righters, is neither an English street nor a 
Muslim street [sic] — separation is necessary for distinctiveness. Some alt-righters 
make a more subtle argument. They say that when different groups are brought to-
gether, the common culture starts to appeal to the lowest common denominator. 
Instead of mosques or English houses, you get atheism and stucco. (Bokhari/Yian-
nopoulos 2016: n.pag.) 
The two authors themselves engage in this play of signifiers and ideologies when, in the 
same article, they accuse the “Establishment conservatives” of not taking seriously the 
fears of “white voters that they’re going to go extinct” by “openly [welcoming] that extinc-
tion” (Bokhari/Yiannopoulos 2016: n.pag.). Milo Yiannopoulos himself has taken the am-
biguity about matters of race and racism to perfection, it seems. In a piece for the online 
magazine The Stranger, Rich Smith dissects some of Yiannopoulos’ arguments and alleged 
attitudes on the issue and states that, while he claimed in a speech at the University of 
Colorado on 26 January 2017, that white supremacy “isn’t the way to go” and that “you 
shouldn’t give a shit about skin colour […], and you should be deeply suspicious about the 
people who do” (qtd. in Smith 2017: n.pag.), Yiannopoulos himself seemed to be 
“strangely unsuspicious” of both his endorsement of the self-declared white supremacist 
Richard Spencer as well as of his own attitudes, reflected in his launching the “Privilege 
Grant.” In a similarly ambiguous way, Smith argues, Yiannopoulos has at times both en-
dorsed and rejected the label “alt-right” (2017: n. pag.).12 
 While Yiannopoulos might be considered as merely an exceptional figure, a grotesque 
clown cynically playing the ideologically ambiguous transgressive, his performance nev-
ertheless representatively hints at the problems that one encounters when trying to study 
the “alt-right” or the current new right in general. His popularity with a predominantly 
white male audience at least testifies to the increasing acceptability of “non-pc” attitudes. 
In many ways, this ties in with the current shifts in performing white identity, for Yian-
nopoulos’ crusade against political correctness, very much like the appeal of Donald 
Trump, seems to resonate with sections of the white population who feel themselves to 
be “beleaguered.” As Amanda E. Lewis has argued, "[t]here are multiple ways of express-
ing or doing whiteness. However, there is at any particular time a dominant form that 
shapes the lives of all those living within that particular racial formation" (2004: 626). In 
that respect, the new right’s (and its alt-right segments) way of “doing” whiteness consists 
in challenging the perceived hegemony of politically correct forms of ‘victimised’ white-
ness. They are part of the “competing racial logics” which challenge “hegemonic common 
sense” (Lewis 2004: 632n15). In the current discourse, whiteness and nation are used as 
                                                        
12 In another piece for breitbart.com, Yiannopoulos elaborates on his relationship with the alt-right: “Trust 
me, alt-right hardliners don’t like me any more than they like the Republican establishment or Hillary: I’m 
a degenerate, race-mixing gay Jew, and they don’t let me forget it! That is to say, I’m a chronicler of, and 
occasional fellow traveller with, the alt-right. But I’m certainly no ringleader” (2016: n.pag.). 
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vessels of belonging – racial configurations thus ultimately fill a vacuum left by neoliberal 
and neoconservative governmentality, with the aim to establish new forms of white gov-
ernmentality.  
 Race and whiteness are never straightforward affairs and must be considered in their 
different semiotic and representational guises as well as in their intersections with other 
vectors of identity and belonging such as class, gender, sexuality, religion – race, as 
Amanda E. Lewis argues, is “a set of identities, discursive practices, cultural forms, and 
ideological manifestations” (2004: 625). This set of identities is at the centre of a struggle 
over ideological hegemony between the right and left of the political spectrum. Just as the 
(new) right mobilises racially connoted sets of identities, such sets are being used on the 
other side of the spectrum to make sense of the rise and appeal of the new right. While 
the right evokes a feeling of “beleaguredness” of white, western-European identities, at-
tempts at explaining the appeal of the new right take their cue from certain sets of white 
identities and their intersections. Crucially, the flipside of the current struggle over hege-
monic forms of raciality, is the tendency in liberal and left-wing discourse to identify the 
poor, uneducated white working-class as the core of the problem posed by the rise of the 
new right.  
 
Struggles over the White Working Class 
Diagnosing a “crisis of white identity”, Amanda Taub tries to make sense of the Brexit vote 
and Trump’s success in a piece for the New York Times: “If you are a working-class white 
person and you fear that the new, cosmopolitan world will destroy or diminish an identity 
you cherish, you have no culturally acceptable way to articulate what you perceive as a 
crisis” (2016: n.pag.). Yet, while Taub acknowledges “a certain fluidity” to conceptions of 
whiteness, her own focus on the anxious and disadvantaged white working class may 
prove problematic as well (2016: n.pag.). When she states that “[f]or generations, work-
ing-class whites were doubly blessed: They enjoyed privileged status based on race, as 
well as the fruits of broad economic growth” (Taub 2016: n.pag.), it does not quite become 
clear when and where exactly the white working class was fully (and homogeneously) 
implied in formations of white privilege. After all, as the case of white trash in the US 
demonstrates, certain sections of the white lower classes have been excluded from such 
privileges (cf. Hartigan Jr. 2005; Wray 2006). And in Britain, the whiteness (or the grant-
ing of its privileges) of the working class has historically been far from self-evident as well 
(cf. Bonnett 2000: 32-38; Garner 2007: 72-75; Ware 2001: 191; Jones 2011).  
 Thus, the essentialisation of the white working class in a way that sketches their de-
velopment from a racially privileged homogeneous group into becoming a hotbed for rac-
ist and right-wing radicalism borne out of desperation over losing that privilege entails 
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the risk of losing sight of the inherent paradoxes of whiteness and racial identities in gen-
eral. It also entails the risk of installing the white working class as a scapegoat for recent 
political developments which, however, are equally multi-factorial. Race and class, how-
ever decisive and crucial, are but two of the many factors of the recent political situation 
in the US, Britain and other European states.  
 In that respect, white working-classness must be understood as an intersection of 
identities that, just as any other identity formation, can be performed in a number of ways, 
and the preconditions for these performances are always historically distinctive. Thus, 
while the British white working class of the 19th century, for instance, was rendered “sub-
human” (Ware 2001: 191) and excluded from the privileged domain of Anglo-Saxon 
whiteness, the conditions in the 20th and 21st century have changed. For instance, white 
members of the working class might benefit from white privilege in one situation, while 
being demonised for supposedly representing an ‘abject’ form of hyper-whiteness when 
seen as a homogeneous group of Trump- or Brexit-voting nationalists and white suprem-
acists, to point out just two possible extremes. Racial hegemony is therefore never a 
smooth process, and the current feelings of “beleaguredness” felt by sections of the white 
working class (and it is important to stress that there are also other possible forms of 
performing white working-classness beyond racial hysteria) is but one aspect of what 
Imogen Tyler calls the “endless reconfiguration of abject others” (2013: 9).  
 These abjectifying strategies are also part of the formation of hegemony. However, 
just like the content and meaning of whiteness “appears to be of a volatile nature, easily 
evaporating when put under pressure” (Ware 2001: 192), hegemony “is never total or 
final” (Lewis 2004: 632n15). Thus,  
[i]n any particular historical moment, […] certain forms of whiteness become dom-
inant. [...] Hegemonic whiteness thus is a shifting configuration of practices and 
meanings that occupy the dominant position in a particular racial formation and that 
successfully manage to occupy the empty space of ‘normality’ in our culture. (Lewis 
2004: 634) 
In order to make sense of the intricate struggles over racialized hegemony, what is needed 
is what Stuart Hall has called “the non-reductive approach to questions concerning the 
interrelationship between class and race” (1996: 435). This means to critically dissect 
where race (or whiteness) and class have come to mutually express each other (cf. Hall 
1980: 341).  
 With respect to the way whiteness, and more precisely, a specific white working-class 
identity, has been contested in connection with the rise of the new right, it is important to 
identify how this particular mode of identity has been used in the struggle over hegemony. 
In his 2011 book on the “demonization” of the British white working class, Owen Jones 
offered a prognosis which in many ways anticipated the political events of 2016. Jones 
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critically reflects on the assumption that the British working class has, in the 21st century, 
increasingly harboured anti-immigration sentiments and that these sentiments result 
from exclusively racial problems. For Jones, anti-immigration sentiments cannot be ex-
plained by a recourse to white identity and a longing for white hegemony:  
Anti-immigration rhetoric has gained traction for far more complex reasons than 
mere culture or race. Indeed, many ethnic minority working-class people share the 
popular hostility to immigration. But at a time of growing insecurity about jobs and 
wages, immigration has provided a convenient scapegoat as well as an excuse to 
dodge questions that are far more relevant. (2011: 245)  
These anti-immigration sentiments are thus a consequence of the evasion of class 
throughout the Blair and Brown governments. As a consequence, “[r]ight-wing populism 
is on the rise – and it is shamelessly courting working-class people” (Jones 2011: 245).13 
The “savvy new populist right” in the form of UKIP and the English Defence League, Jones 
argues, “is comfortable talking about class and […] offers reactionary solutions to work-
ing-class problems” (2011: 245.) by blaming Labour for abandoning their core electorate 
and multiculturalism for “undermining ‘white’ working-class identity” (2011: 246).  
 For the US, Joel Olson has made a similar argument by tracing the transformation of 
post-Civil Rights America from a society in which “whiteness has been transformed from 
a form of social standing to a norm” which, ultimately, “created ressentiment” (2008: 705) 
that could not be compensated by the major political parties. Since “[o]ne of the key func-
tions of official policies and unofficial practices of racial oppression is to reduce class con-
flict among the dominant group” (Olson 2008: 707), the “normalization” of whiteness 
caused intra-group conflicts among many whites which “presented a political opportunity 
for the minority party, if they could mobilize it” (Olson 2008: 704). Like Amanda Lewis 
and Amy Ansell, Olson offers a Gramscian analysis of this situation and concludes that 
“[t]he great irony of the destruction of white standing is that it did not lead to [Martin 
Luther] King’s beloved community but rather to Gramsci’s war of position” (2008: 715). 
This ties in with Steve Garner’s recent conception of the “neoliberal postracial state” in 
which a “technocratic” official anti-racism that has been decoupled from the “struggles 
that brought it about […] in the late 1960s and 1970s” goes hand in hand with the “chan-
nelling [of] ‘race’ and racism from the public into the private domains” (2016: 46). Garner 
describes how in the current climate of neoliberalism, race and racism have gradually be-
come something that is publicly individualised, among others, in the form of isolated, yet 
newsworthy stories (e.g. individual politicians, footballers or other public persons ‘over-
stepping the mark’) while the idea of systemic racism remains unaddressed. In a similar 
                                                        
13 Similarly, Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin conclude their study on the rise of the far right in Britain 
by stating that “UKIP’s revolt is a working-class phenomenon. […]. In a sense, UKIP’s rise represents the re-
emergence of class conflicts that Tony Blair’s New Labour and David Cameron’s compassionate Conserva-
tism submerged but never resolved” (2014: 270). 
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way, incidences like the frequent shootings of black men in the US (such as in the cases of 
Trayvon Martin or Michael Brown) are being framed “as if they are random individual 
events about anything except ‘race’” (Garner 2016: 47). However, in the private realm – 
that is, in the everyday interactions of the people –, race and a racialized perception of 
social relations remains dominant. Resulting from this, the “war of position” can be found 
in the way political narratives are created by the competing major parties and their can-
didates. The resulting ideological vacuum, it could be said, has been taken advantage of 
by Trumpian populist strategies which, through their various guises, appeal to a predom-
inantly white electorate. 
 Following this argument, it becomes possible to regard whiteness as a vessel through 
which hegemonic identity politics are being negotiated. Considering whiteness and its 
(hegemonic) effects in this way, it also becomes possible to account for the often paradox-
ical and twisted way in which whiteness and racial identities are put to work in the cur-
rent discourses surrounding the new right. This is not to diminish the often hurtful effects 
of white hegemony in the US and in Britain to the mere play of ultimately empty signifiers. 
After all, symbolic boundaries and hierarchies do have material effects. Yet, even while 
there might be “true” white supremacists who adhere to a systematic ideology of supreme 
cultural and ethnic whiteness, more often than not, what is at the heart of the current 
conflicts is a more ambivalent notion of whiteness. Studying whiteness in relation to the 
new right thus means to shed light on the “plural trajectories of whiteness” which show 
the “internal and external boundaries of the white ‘we’ […] to be contingent” (Garner 
2007: 76).  
 Here, Garner’s criticism of academic ‘trends’ in the study of whiteness is worth heed-
ing. He argues that writing “on white racialized identities has focused disproportionately 
[…] on working-class men” which, ultimately, might say more about “the academy’s mid-
dle-class composition” and tradition (2007: 72) and creates a “selective picture” (2007: 
78) of the distribution of racist attitudes in society. What is more, it is middle- and upper-
class citizens who, in case of doubt, have been the gatekeepers of white belonging 
throughout the last centuries. In the current political climate, blaming the outcome of elec-
tions or referenda exclusively on the white working classes would thus be a conceptual 
mistake. In the most extreme cases, the white working class would thus become the abject 
Other of the respectable and therefore dominant (white) middle class. Thus, as Amanda 
Lewis argues, whiteness as a hegemonic formation can only be productively analysed if it 
is considered in context with other identity factors since  
it is practically impossible to divorce the social category whiteness from its role as 
a force of domination and subjugation. […]. Studying whiteness or white people ab-
sent of social context obscures the precise reason why it is important to focus on 
whiteness in the first place – in order to remove the cloak of normality and univer-
sality that helps to secure continuing racial privilege for whites. (2004: 642) 
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Conclusion: Thinking About the Future of Whiteness 
In her recent book on The Future of Whiteness, Linda Alcoff argues that the current demo-
graphic shifts in the US will eventually lead to whites becoming the minority ethnicity, 
and this will lead to transformations in the understanding and status of whiteness as an 
identity: “Whiteness will no longer be invisible when the majority of Americans find it so 
very visible in its foregrounded status as the newest minority. It will no longer be a default 
identity for leadership, nor will it be able to justify its cultural hegemony” (2015: 25). As 
my discussion of various aspects of the current rise of the political right in the US and 
Britain, whiteness and whites’ anxieties about their identity has shown, the appeal of 
these politics might well be a reaction to these impending changes. Yet, while many on the 
new right might in fact strive to preserve a perceived “traditional” way of being European-
white, the discussion has also shown that the current debates and struggles over cultural 
hegemony are not always necessarily about whiteness per se, and that what is being 
evoked as whiteness in these discourses is very often not exclusively concerned with ra-
cial identity, but rather (consciously as well as unconsciously) uses whiteness and race as 
vessels or co-factors for other ideas.  
 Yet, whiteness cannot always be said to be a substitute signifier for something else. In 
fact, as I contend with Linda Alcoff, “[w]hite supremacy is built into our material culture” 
(2015: 26) and is “far from ontologically empty” (2015: 8). Thus, whiteness may be fleet-
ing, but it is never not there – it is, as Vron Ware has said, “of a volatile nature” (2001: 
192). The task of Critical Whiteness Studies in the current political conjuncture must 
therefore be to identify it in its ever-evolving intersections and particularities. Whiteness 
is as far from being a monolithic identity as it is from being an ontologically empty signi-
fier. As my discussion has shown, it is often precisely in the intra-group conflicts that 
whiteness becomes politically crucial, and a good deal of the current rise in racism stems 
from these conflicts and is being projected onto the non-white population. Coming to 
terms with the current rise of racism associated with the new right in Britain and the US 
thus necessitates thinking critically about the future of whiteness as a lived experience, as 
Alcoff demands. If race and whiteness are haunting the political “war of position” over 
hegemony as a war over culture and ideas, then this conflict cannot be won by ignoring 
these categories even if they are fleeting signifiers without scientific validity. The critical 
reflection on symbolic and material boundaries erected through the recourse to white-
ness must therefore be a main concern in the analysis of the dominant formations of the 
political right. 
 Finally, in a time when the right seems to be able to form at least symbolic transna-
tional coalitions, the emergence of (new) racisms needs to be grasped in its contingencies 
across time and cultures. The recent months have seen a significant exchange between 
protagonists of the new right, from Nigel Farage’s meetings and public appearances with 
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Donald Trump to the 2017 Koblenz congress of European far-right leaders in high spirits 
about the Brexit referendum and the Trump victory (among them France’s Marine Le Pen, 
the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders and members of Germany’s AfD). The latter is particularly 
significant, for it once more raises the question about the adaptability of Critical White-
ness Studies in cultural contexts beyond the Anglophone world.14 After all, Critical White-
ness Studies emerged from a distinctly US-American context and primarily re-traced the 
development of formations of whiteness from an Anglo-American perspective.  
 However, the present conjuncture shows the pressing need to consider whiteness as 
an “interconnected global system” (Ware 2001: 184). Even where it is not an explicit issue, 
the patterns underlying the construction(s) of whiteness and its correlates can be consid-
ered. In Koblenz, for example, talk about “the people of Europe” and the wave of “hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees” which were let into the country “against the will of the 
German people” (Le Pen qtd. in Connolly 2017: n.pag.) evoked the language of race and 
the people (in the sense of the racially connoted German “Volk”). Dissecting the semantic 
repertoire of race in the transnational new right must be a major task for a Critical White-
ness Studies committed to analysing the hegemonic struggle of the right. The study of 
whiteness as a study of racism and its political conditions therefore needs an explicit re-
gard for transnational trajectories, historical context and the intersections of identities. 
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